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ABSTRACT 
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) leverages information technology to 
increase the effectiveness of first responders during disaster recovery.  At the same time, 
cyber attacks against these information technologies have significantly increased.  
Unfortunately, cyber attacks have grown faster than the technologies used to defend 
them.  The reliance on technology coupled with the difficulty of defending it makes it 
unrealistic to assume that communications will always be available when needed.  
Therefore, it is critical that first responders are prepared to operate when one or some of 
their communications abilities are lost.  
Alarmingly, DHS has the responsibility to prepare first responders to operate 
during  disasters; however, they lack the authority to enforce programs to ensure this 
happens.  This lack of authority affects how first responders communicate and provides 
gaps in DHS efforts to prepare for disasters.  Until DHS has the authority to enforce 
change across all levels of government, communications will not be guaranteed during 
disaster recovery operations.  However, DHS could leverage communication outages 
during operational exercises to better prepare first responders.  This thesis explores DHS 
exercises on the federal, state and local levels and how they are preparing first responders 
to operate through cyber attacks. 
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 The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) leverages and directs the resources 
of federal, state, and local governments to protect the American people in their homeland.  
This is a massive undertaking and covers more than 87,000 different jurisdictions across 
the United States.1  DHS prepares for man-made and natural disasters by conducting 
scenario- based exercises across federal, state, and local governments and more recently 
has added in nongovernmental participants.  First responders conduct exercises at all 
levels of government in accordance with the National Exercise Plan (NEP).  The NEP is 
designed to take the lessons learned at the state and local government-level exercises and 
then roll them up to the larger national-level exercises.  What is common in these first 
responder exercises is the fact that cyber and physical have been kept split into separate 
exercises.  This has not allowed the first responders on the front lines to understand how 
to operate when the communications they are using are attacked or simply go down for 
periods of time.  This thesis explores DHS exercises on the federal, state and local levels, 
and how they are preparing first responders to operate through communication outages. 
 An examination of these exercises suggests areas where DHS operations could be 
strengthened.  DHS first responder operational exercises have assumed all 
communication systems will be operating at 100-percent capability and will be available 
for all disasters.  Ardent Sentry, a large-scale first responder operational exercise, was 
even cancelled early in 2006 because basic communications could not be brought on-line.  
DHS’s Cyber Storm exercise is specifically designed to test how critical infrastructures 
can operate while under cyber attack.  However, even that exercise fails to take into 
account the potential for attacks against DHS’s own communications networks.  The 
2008 Cyber Storm final report points out the interdependency of the physical and cyber 
saying, “Cyber events have consequences outside the cyber response community, and 
                                                 
1 Kay Bailey Hutchison, “Kay Bayley Hutchison United States Senator,”  
http://hutchison.senate.gov/govsites.html, (accessed 23 May 2010).  Senator Hutchinson’s website provides 
links and discriptions of federal agencies.  Her site pulls this data from other federal websites.  
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non-cyber events can impact cyber functionality.”2  This presents a gap in how first 
responders prepare for an emergency or disaster recovery operation.  By not testing the 
effects of attacks against its own first responder communications systems, DHS is not 
preparing the nation’s first responders to operate through a communications outage.   
 DHS could better prepare by using the lessons learned in cyber and operational 
functional exercises, and using them in cross functional exercises combining cyber and 
physical scenarios.  By doing this, DHS could introduce “communication systems 
outages” during portions of the exercise.  This would allow DHS to see the effects of a 
cyber attack on a physical operation and provide training for the first responders to 
operate through communication outages.  DHS is preparing for events similar to this 
now; however, they are missing the simple fact that the preparation needs to combine 
both physical and cyber scenarios to provide the best training and ensure first responders 
are prepared to operate without all communications available.   
A. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
 During disaster recovery operations, DHS and first responders communicate 
across multiple types of communication systems.  Communicating across multiple 
systems strengthens the possibility that critical information will reach the agencies when 
needed.  Even with multiple systems, there are challenges when communicating across 
government and nongovernment agencies.  Different agencies deploy different 
communication systems and software that are not always compatible with other agencies 
in a disaster recovery operation.3  This makes it difficult to compare what a cyber attack 
could present to the different agencies.  Some agencies will have multiple communication 
lines that an attacker will have to bring down to slow the operation, while others will 
have a single point of failure.  This is relevant to DHS operating through a cyber attack 
                                                 
2 Department of Homeland Security, “Cyber Storm II Final Report,” July 2009, 
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/csc_ncsd_cyber_stormII_final09.pdf, (accessed 10 April 2010), 3.  
3 Currently, radio frequencies between first responders are not compatible and first responders have to 
carry multiple radios in order to communicate.  When commercial phones are taken out in a disaster the 
systems that DHS deploys cannot legally hook up to commercial cell phones.  Currently, DHS first 
responders hand out cell phones that work on their system; however, the number available is limited and 
distribution takes time—and time is one of the factors that determine the success of the operation. 
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because it reduces the number of systems first responders can use in a disaster recovery 
effort.  Limiting the number of systems used, by first responders, provides a more 
specific target for a cyber attack and amplifies the effects an attack can have on an 
operation.  One of the best ways to operate through a cyber attack is for agencies to have 
the ability to communicate across multiple systems.   
 Across government and nongovernment agencies, communication is crucial 
before and during homeland defense operations; it affects the speed at which the recovery 
takes place and the overall outcome of the operation.  However, if DHS’s 
communications systems are taken down by an adversary, then the department’s reliance 
on complex computer systems to communicate across government and nongovernment 
agencies will become a choke point that can tremendously affect the success of a disaster 
recovery operation.  My research indicates that DHS is not planning sufficiently for a 
cyber attack scenario that could take out communications needed for first responder 
operations.  There are several reasons why this is being overlooked at the present time.  
There is a lack of technical communications systems experts at all levels of government, 
positions are going unfilled, DHS is responsible for areas they do not own, and DHS 
lacks the authority to enforce any changes.   
  Based on the lack of authority to enforce follow up actions, it appears DHS has 
not explored what losing communications during an attack would do to its disaster 
recovery response.  This raises the question of the effects of losing communications 
would have on a homeland security operation.  Currently, there are no numbers or 
statistics that provide expectations of how specific communications outages would affect 
a disaster recovery effort.  I am not suggesting that all communications systems are likely 
to be disrupted at one time for an extended period.  I am advocating that specific systems 
used to communicate during DHS disaster recovery operations could be the target of an 
adversary, and that if brought down, would significantly slow recovery operations.   
 Government agencies have repeatedly demonstrated that communications 
between agencies and within agencies are crucial before and during homeland defense 
operations.  Both the Australian Government’s Security and Critical Infrastructure 
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Division and the United States Department of Homeland Security have echoed how 
critical communication is before and during a major homeland defense operation.4  
Reliance on automated computer systems to conduct daily operations within the United 
States is growing at a fast pace within agencies at all levels.  This rapid growth is 
alarming the experts in two ways.  First, defense of these networks has not kept up with 
the growth of the networks.  Second, there have been poor communications across 
government agencies due to lack of shared information and interoperability problems 
between the automated systems.5  At the same time, some experts believe that since the 
Internet was created as an “open platform,” any system attached to the Internet can be 
accessed by anyone, from anywhere, and at anytime.   
 With the rise of Internet attack tools and the ease of availability, other states, non-
state actors, terrorist groups, and even individuals can attack networks.  The CIA released 
a report, “Preserving National Security in an Increasingly Borderless World,” which 
discusses how United States adversaries will use cyber attacks such as denial-of-service 
attacks to inflict “Weapons of Mass Effect (WME)” against the United States.6  
Historically, most United States government agencies have not placed defense of their 
communications systems as a top priority.  It was not until the United States began seeing 
other nation-state agencies infiltrating their automated communications systems that the 
priority began to change. 
 The United States government put cyber modernization on the back burner until 
recently when they identified the exploitation and defense of automated communications 
systems as being the battlefield of the future.  Clarke and Knake identify several studies 
that have been conducted that point out the growing threat of cyber attacks on the United 
States: 
                                                 
4 Australian Attorney General, “Cyber Storm II final report and Findings,” August 2008, pp. 13–18.  
See also United States Department of Homeland Security, “Cyber Storm II Final Report,” July 2009, 3.  
5 Peter Buxbaum, “Air Force Explores the Next Frontier,” 17 Febuary 2007, 
http://gcn.com/articles/2007/02/17/air-force-explores-the-next-frontier.aspx, (accessed 23 May 2010). 
6 Lawrence K. Gershwin, “Statement for the Record: Cyber Threat Trends,” 21 June 2001, 
https://www.cia.gov/news-information/speeches-testimony/2001/gershwin_speech_06222001.html, 
(accessed 9 June 2010). 
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Part of the reason we are so unprepared today is “the boy who cried wolf 
too soon” phenomenon.  Sometimes the boy who cries wolf can see the 
wolf coming from a lot farther away than everyone else.  The Joint 
Security Commission of 1994, the Marsh Commission of 1997, the Center 
for Strategic and International Studies commission of 2008, the National 
Academy of Science commission of 2009, and many more in between 
have all spoken of a major cyber security or cyber war risk.7  
 Military professionals have used the slogan, “To kill people and break things,” as 
the purpose of war, when in fact, the purpose of war is to modify your opponent’s 
behavior and inflict your will upon him.8  This type of thinking is not new to warfare and 
was pointed out 2,500 years ago when Sun Tzu pronounced, “Supreme excellence 
consists of breaking the enemy’s resistance without fighting.”9  During the 1990s and 
through the early 2000s, there was debate among United States government policy 
makers on how to classify government automated communications systems.10  During 
that time, many policy makers only viewed automated communications systems as 
enablers for physical operations.11  This is interesting since historically signal intercept 
operations have been used in defensive efforts.  The Western alliance used message 
interceptions to understand German and Japanese actions and took counter actions based 
on this information to defeat them in WWII.  Further, the Israeli government destroyed a 
Syrian facility thought to be related to weapons of mass destruction.  What is interesting 
about this attack is how the Syrian air defense system never reacted to the Israeli fighter 
jets entering their air space.  The Israelis had hacked into the Syrian system and what 
appeared on the Syrians’ screen was what the Israelis had put there that night: a virtual 
                                                 
7 Richard Clarke and Rob Knake, Cyber War The Next Threat to National Security and What To Do 
About It, New York: Harper Collins, 2010, 135. 
8 Douglas H. Dearth, “Rethinking the Application of Power in the 21st Century,”  n.d., 
http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/army/mipb/1997-1/dearth.htm, (accessed 30 May 2010). 
9 Alan Campen, Douglas H. Dearth, and R. Thomas Gooden, Cyber war Security, Stategy and Conflict 
in the Information Age, Fairfax Virginia: AFCEA International Press, May 1996, 251. 
10 Classify from a perspective of a center of gravity for war and a weapon system.  This becomes more 
evident when the United States Air Force changed the tier and structure of all its communications career 
fields in May 2010.  They are now considered Cyber Operators vs. Communications Managers. 
11 United States Department of Defense, “Information Operations Roadmap,”  30 October 2003, 2. 
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clear sky.12  These are just two examples, but they clearly show that adversaries are 
willing to exploit communication systems to defeat an enemy, and will be discussed in 
later chapters. 
B. DHS DISASTER PREPARDNESS 
   In response to 9/11, the United States created DHS, and since then the 
Department of Defense has added two major commands that defend United States 
automated communications systems.  In 2002, the Department of Defense activated the 
United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM), and in 2009, the United States 
Cyber Command (US Cyber Command) was created.   
 The focus of these agencies has been to prevent adversaries from getting into 
automated communications systems, to ensure interoperability across agencies, and to 
assist in recovery of the systems, once they fail. If United States automated systems were 
deliberately attacked by an adversary during a disaster recovery effort what effects would 
this have on their success?  Would first responders simply be “neutralized” as Campen 
pointed out back in 1996?13   
 In the last Cyber Storm exercise, there were eight major findings by DHS and all 
revolved around failures in communications.14  This should highlight to DHS that there is 
a growing concern that all communication systems might not be available or work 
properly during a disaster recovery effort if attacked by an adversary.  There have also 
been exercises for first responder operations that have assumed they will have all 
automated systems, at all times, running at full capacity.  From lessons learned at Ardent 
Sentry and Cyber Storm, it is not likely this will be the case in a real-world event. With 
the increasing threat of cyber attacks, this thesis argues that DHS needs to be prepared to 
operate without full communications capability.   
                                                 
12 Richard Clarke and Rob Knake, Cyber War The Next Threat to National Security and What To Do 
About It, New York: Harper Collins, 2010, 1–5. 
13 Douglas H. Dearth, “Rethinking the Application of Power in the 21st Century,” 
 n.d., http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/army/mipb/1997-1/dearth.htm, (accessed 30 May 2010). 
14 Department of Homeland Security, “Cyber Storm II Final Report,” July 2009, 
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/csc_ncsd_cyber_stormII_final09.pdf, (accessed 10 April 2010), 3. 
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 DHS exercises that build scenarios on the effects of operations if specific 
communications systems were down or not operating for periods of time during a real-
world disaster response, will help first responders prepare for future disaster operations.  
At a meeting in July 2009, Air Force General Arthur Lichte, Commander of Air Mobility 
Command (AMC), echoed this concern, by inquiring how AMC could move people and 
cargo if their communications systems were under attack.15  The concern of operating 
through a cyber attack is being voiced; however, the preparation for operating through an 
attack is not being done.   
 Historically, government agencies conducted communication systems outage or 
“comm-out” exercises, where they tested how to operate in the event that electronic 
communications systems were lost.  Yet, despite the growing reliance on electronic 
communications, “comm-out” exercises have disappeared.  This thesis explores why 
“comm-out” exercises are not being used to prepare first responders and argues that they 
should be included in the general exercises. 
C. METHODS AND SOURCES 
 The thesis used reports available through open sources, including reports of 
lessons learned, Inspector General reports, and United States Government of 
Accountability (GAO) reports.  Further, the research compared how the European Union 
is preparing their first responders versus the United States in the event of a cyber attack.  
DHS was unable to provide any information during this research; therefore, all the 
information included in this thesis was obtained through open source documents posted 
on the Internet.  The nature of this research does expose first responder vulnerabilities to 
cyber attacks during a disaster recovery effort; however, these vulnerabilities are 
available to anyone with Internet access.  DHS could use this research to synergize their 
exercises and become better prepared to operate through a major cyber attack.  
                                                 
15 Air Mobility Command (AMC) is responsible for getting supplies, troops and weapons to the 
physical domain of war.  AMC flies 900 sorties per day and a plane takes off every 90 seconds.  This is 
how the U.S. is able to react to and sustain large-scale operations.  This effort is controlled by about 100 
personnel on duty at any given time across the globe and relies heavily on automated communications 
systems to make it happen. 
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 Chapter II will focus on the growing threat of cyber attacks.  It outlines what 
attack tools are being used in cyber space, how these tools emerged, and how current 
defenses are not stopping the attacks.  Further, it highlights how nations are willing to use 
cyber attacks in conjunction with physical attacks.  In addition, this chapter will point out 
that cyber attacks have the ability to be targeted.  Last, it will outline what a future cyber 
attack on critical infrastructure could look like, and the fact that the tools are available 
today to conduct such an attack.  Chapter III will explain the four DHS mission areas and 
how they relate to first responder communications.  In addition, it points out there are 
communication problems in each of the four DHS mission areas that are not currently 
being addressed.  Further, these problems are significant enough to enable 
communication outages from cyber attack, if not addressed.  Chapter IV will highlight 
the lessons learned from first responder exercises at local, state, and the national level.  It 
does not encompass the lessons learned from every first responder exercise because after 
action reports and lessons learned are usually kept close hold by the agency conducting 
the exercises.  However, there were enough sources on the open Internet to highlight 
common findings that need DHS attention with respect to their first responder 
communications.  Chapter IV includes a table with common findings across all levels of 
first responder communications.  Chapter V will use the observations from chapters II, 
III, and IV in order to build a base proposal for “comm-out” first responder operational 




II. CYBER ATTACK  
If you entrench yourself behind strong fortifications, you compel the 
enemy to seek a solution elsewhere. 
—Carl von Clausewitz  
A. INTRODUCTION 
 Historically, cyber attackers have found creative ways to thwart cyber defenses.  
We live in a time and age where a majority of our society relies heavily on digital 
communications to conduct daily business and their personal lives. Just the thought of 
any of our digital communications not being available on demand is becoming 
unthinkable.  This chapter will take the first step in presenting the case that digital 
communications may not be available when needed by DHS in disaster recovery 
operations.  It will show that attackers have continued to find creative ways to conduct 
cyber attacks.  In addition, the cases presented will show that the technology exists to 
conduct cyber attacks against United States assets.  These attacks may be against United 
States companies, critical infrastructure, and DHS first responders. The objective of these 
attackers may be to support military action against the United States, or further an 
organizations’ political agenda.  The last section of this chapter will outline a possible 
future cyber attack that could cripple a major hospital, which first responders depend on 
during disaster recovery.  This scenario describes how an attack against one of the United 
States’ critical infrastructures could happen. 
B. CYBER ATTACK TOOLS 
 Cyber attacks employ malicious software called “malware” to conduct harmful 
activities on electronic communications.  Malware is a term used to identify computer 
software designed to damage or produce other unwanted actions without the consent of 
the systems’ owner.  It is a generic term that covers all types of destructive software to 
include computer viruses, worms, trojan horses, spyware, logic bombs, key loggers, 
10 
 
scareware, backdoors,  botnet code, sniffers, and rootkits.(16)(17)  When discussing and 
understanding malware, these ten categories are not independent of each other and are 
often blended together to achieve a desired objective.  Further, each of these types of 
malware can carry different types of payload depending on the desired objective of the 
cyber attack.  Payloads can serve a variety of objectives, including sabotage, espionage, 
fraud, control, amusement, protest, denial of service, extortion, and even physical 
destruction.   
 Cyber attacks can be classified in four categories: penetration attacks, bandwidth 
flooding attacks, cyber infrastructure attacks, and electronic warfare attacks.  Penetration 
attacks seek to gain access to an automated system and then elevate privileges, often with 
the help of rootkits.  Rootkits allow attackers to mask intrusion and gain elevated 
privileges to a computer or network.18  Bandwidth flooding attacks are normally used to 
conduct denial of service attacks, and involve overwhelming a network with large 
amounts of traffic. Cyber infrastructure attacks focus on vulnerabilities found in Internet 
services, such as Domain Name Systems (DNS), and seek to hijack the service or 
otherwise interfere with its normal operation.  Electronic warfare attacks seek to jam 
communication signals or inject signals into a communications transfer that changes the 
information.19   
 Known cyber attacks can often be blocked by firewalls, intrusion detection tools, 
and malware scanning software; however, there is a growing number of unique forms of 
malware that severely stress current defenses.  Most current defenses rely on known 
signature files to block malware; however, these usually fail against new forms.   
 
 
                                                 
16 NOTE:  Definition of Malware came from, “The Tech Terms Computer Dictionary,” and can be 
found online at http://www.techterms.com/definition/malware.  
17 NOTE: Types of Malware source was from a lecture by Dorothy Denning on 19 July 2010 given at 
the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey California. 
18 Shon Harris, All in One CISSP Exam Guide: Fifth Edition,2010, 649. 




Blocking these requires more sophisticated defenses based on behavioral analysis.  Many 
systems are not adequately protected with such defenses, making new malware an 
especially serious threat.     
 McAfee, a software security company which writes anti-malware software tools 
to detect and remove malware from a computer or network, began collecting a database 
of unique malware in 1986.  While it took them 22 years, from 1986 through 2008, to 
collect the first 10 million unique samples of malware, it only took another year for that 
number to double to over 20 million, and in early 2010 the number had jumped to over 44 
million.(20)(21)  We are now seeing over 54,000 new malware samples on the Internet 
every day.22  This exponential growth of malware is making it very difficult to ensure 
communications will always be available when needed.  If an adversary were to use this 
type of malware against first responders, it could significantly slow a recovery effort.   
C. VIRUSES AND WORMS 
 Viruses were among the earliest forms of malware, and a ninth grader named 
Richard Skrenta used his 1982 Apple II computer to create the first.23  Since computer 
viruses must have a host application to replicate, and early Apple computers stored their 
operating systems on floppy disk, it was easy for Skrenta to spread his virus via floppy 
disk through computer labs at his high school.  By 1986, the most popular home 
computer in the world was built on an IBM platform, and that same year, the first virus 
for IBM computers was developed and released into the wild. 24, 25 Through the late 
                                                 
20 Francois Paget, “Malware at Midyear: a Summary,” McAfee Labs, 7 July 2010, 
https://www.afit.edu/cip/index.cfm, (accessed 20 October 2010). 
21 Francois Paget, “Malware at Midyear: a Summary,” McAfee Labs, 7 July 2010, 
https://www.afit.edu/cip/index.cfm, (accessed 20 October 2010). 
22 NOTE:  Malware writers build off each others’ code and it does not require much skill to create 
new malware. 
23 Paquette, “A History of Viruses,” Symantec, 16 July 2000,  
http://www.symantec.com/connect/articles/history-viruses, (accessed 18 September 2010). 
24 NOTE:  the phrase, “In the wild,” is a computer term that means outside a testing environment or 
on the Internet with no controls. 
25 Paquette, “A History of Viruses,” Symantec, 16 July 2000,  
http://www.symantec.com/connect/articles/history-viruses, (accessed 18 September 2010). 
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1980s, viruses spread primarily through the boot sector and executable files on a floppy 
disk.  Today, viruses spread through online media such as file sharing and e-mail, as well 
as portable media such as Universal Serial Bus (USB) memory sticks.  The viruses of the 
late 1980s also transformed from harmless pranks into malicious attacks destroying 
digital information.   
 The late 1980s also brought about the launch of the first computer worms.  
Worms are similar to viruses, except they can spread on their own, without users taking 
explicit actions or the execution of a host application.  They are self-contained programs 
that, once released, look for known vulnerabilities in computer systems and reproduce by 
exploiting these vulnerabilities.26  Because worms can replicate on their own, they are 
able to spread across the Internet at much greater speeds than viruses.   
 Although not the first worms to be introduced into the wild, the “Code-Red” 
worm and the “Slammer” worm provide a good comparison on how fast worms can 
spread on their own.  When Code-Red was launched on the morning of July 19, 2001, it 
was designed to exploit a known vulnerability in Microsoft’s IIS (Internet Information 
Services) Web server.  At the peak of Code-Red’s growth, it was infecting over two 
thousand systems per minute and, in just 14 hours, it infected 359,000 machines across 
the globe.27  
 In comparison to Code-Red, when the Slammer worm was launched just two 
years later in 2003, it was two orders of magnitude faster than Code-Red.  With Slammer, 
the number of systems infected doubled every 8.5 seconds in comparison to 37 minutes 
with Code-Red.  This never before seen rate of growth allowed the Slammer worm to 
infect 90 percent of the systems in the world that were vulnerable to this attack in only 10 
minutes.28  It only took this single packet worm 30 minutes to spread to over 200,000 
                                                 
26 Shon Harris, All in One CISSP Exam Guide: Fifth Edition,2010, 1020. 
27 David Moore, “The Spread of the Code-Red Worm,”  The Cooperative Association for Internet 
Data Analysis, 24 July 2001, http://www.caida.org/research/security/code-red/#background, (accessed 1 
October 2010). 
28 David Moore, “The Spread of the Slammer Worm,”  The Cooperative Association for Internet Data 
Analysis, 2003, http://www.caida.org/publications/papers/2003/sapphire/, (accessed 1 October 2010). 
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systems around the globe.  The Slammer worm was faster than previously launched 
worms because it used far less bandwidth and employed a better strategy for propagation.  
It was comprised of a single 404-byte User Datagram Protocol (UDP) packet compared 
to Code-Red’s 4 Kbyte payload.29   
 It is important to note that both of these worms had a negative impact on society.  
Code-Red caused an estimated $2.62 Billion in global economic impact and was able to 
shut down a Japanese airline-ticketing counter, delaying 15,000 passengers for 2 hours.30  
The Slammer worm shut down ATMs in South Korea, emergency 911 systems, airline 
booking systems, and a monitoring system for a nuclear plant in Ohio; it also impacted 
control systems on electrical and water utilities.(31)(32)(33)  In both cases, a known 
vulnerability for which patches existed was exploited.  However, it is evident with the 
global spread of these two worms that systems administrators around the world were not 
updating their systems.  These two cases are representative of the increase threat of cyber 
attacks.  In just a few short years, malware grew from simple pranks in high schools to 
malicious attacks that affected electrical power grids, nuclear power plant networks, and 
emergency response communication systems.   
D. ESPIONAGE   
 Espionage is a normal occurrence between companies and states; however, prior 
to the Internet and cyber attacks, it had to be conducted manually.  Before the Internet, a 
                                                 
29 David Moore, Vern Paxson, Stefan Savage, Colleen Shannon, Stuart Staniford, and Nicholas 
Weaver, “Inside the Slammer Worm,” IEEE Computer Society, 2003, 
http://cseweb.ucsd.edu/~savage/papers/IEEESP03.pdf, (accessed 17 October 2010). 
30 Computer Economics, “Malicious Code Attacks Had $13.2 Billion Economic Impact in 2001,” 
Computer Economics: Metrics for managers September 2002, 
http://www.computereconomics.com/article.cfm?id=133, (accessed 18 Spetember 2010). 
31 Kevin Poulsen, “Slammer Worm Crashed Ohio Nuke Plant Network,” Security Focus, 19 August 
2003, http://www.securityfocus.com/news/6767, (accessed 7 May 2010). 
32 A. Creery, “Industrial Cybersecurity for Power System and SCADA Networks,”  Andritz 
Automation,  n.d., http://www.andritzautomation.com/documents/industrialcybersecurity.pdf, (accessed 10 
August 2010). 
33 Peter Abraham, “The Slammer Worm Attack: The worst attack to date, probably not the last,” 




spy had to have insider access to classified data relating to United States national 
security; now they simply have to hack into a computer system and download the 
information.  In the true-life movie, the Falcon and the Snowman set in the late 1970s, it 
takes thousands of dollars, an insider with a security clearance and lots of time to steal a 
very small amount of information.34  Conversely, with cyber infiltration, terabytes of 
information can be downloaded with little cost to the spy or spying agencies in very a 
short amount time.  
 Cyber espionage has targeted highly protected government networks, as well as 
major corporations.  The next three cases, Moonlight Maze, Titan Rain, and Operation 
Aurora will make the point that even protected networks can be penetrated.  In each of 
these three cases, network security departments were defending the targeted networks, 
but their electronic defenses were defeated.   
1. Moonlight Maze 
 An early example of cyber espionage to steal mass amounts of data was coded 
“Moonlight Maze”.  Moonlight Maze was an ongoing FBI case that uncovered that data 
was being stolen from United States critical networks.  The intrusions conducted during 
Moonlight Maze began in 1998 and continued for several years.35  Two significant 
aspects displayed the growing sophistication associated with cyber attacks.  First, they 
were sustained for over a three-year period.  This level of a continued intrusion had never 
been seen prior to Moonlight Maze, and proved that it is possible to conduct a sustained 
cyber attack.  Second, when United States computer security specialists attempted to fight 
the attack, they were defeated.  The intrusions consistently went around defenses, and at 
times, became stealth to United States defenders.36  By the time they were noticed, they 
                                                 
34 Bonnie Sayer, “The Falcon and The Snowman,” Epinions, 30 September 2001, 
http://www99.epinions.com/review/mvie_mu-1007016/content_42021654148, (accessed 1 October 2010). 
35 CNN Tech, “Epic Cyber Attack Reveals Cracks in United States Defense,” CNN Tech, 10 May 
2001,  http://articles.cnn.com/2001-05-10/tech/3.year.cyberattack.idg_1_moonlight-maze-hackers-russian-
Internet-addresses?_s=PM:TECH, (accessed 17 March 2010). 
36 Richard A. Clarke, and Robert K. Knake, Cyber War: The Next Threat to National Security and 
What to do About it, 2010,111. 
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had been going on for over two years.  Investigators determined that the source was a 
mainframe computer in Russia, and that the targets included the Pentagon, NASA, the 
Energy Department, universities, and research labs.  When the United States government 
asked Russia if they were sponsoring the intrusions, the Russian government denied any 
involvement.  
2. Titan Rain 
 Another well-known case of cyber espionage happened in 2004, and was given 
the code name Titan Rain.37  Titian Rain was an FBI investigation that determined 
classified data was being stolen electronically through the Internet from Sandia Labs, 
Army Research Labs, Lockheed Martin, NASA, and the World Bank.  The investigation 
determined that Chinese hackers had infiltrated Sandia Labs, United States government 
agencies, United States military installations, and defense contractors, and had 
electronically stolen critical information protecting United States national security.   
3. Operation Aurora 
 A more recent and highly sophisticated case of cyber espionage against United 
States companies was code named “Operation Aurora” by the computer security 
company McAfee.38  Interestingly, Operation Aurora involved coordinated attacks 
against 20 major corporations with large computer security departments.39  According to 
the vice president of McAfee’s threat research, Dmitri Alperovitch, this type of attack has 
never been seen outside of the defense industry and stated, “We have never ever, outside 
of the defense industry, seen commercial industrial companies come under that level of 
sophisticated attack, it’s totally changing the threat model.”  Alperovitch goes on to point 
                                                 
37 Richard Stiennon, Surviving Cyber War, The Scarecrow Press 2010, 1–10. 
38 Kim Zetter, “Google Hack Attack Was Ultra Sophisticated, New Details Show,” Wired, 2010, 
http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2010/01/operation-aurora/, (accessed 22 October 2010). 
39 McAfee, “Operation Aurora,” McAfee, 14 January 2010, 
http://www.mcafee.com/us/threat_center/operation_aurora.html, (accessed 22 october 2010). 
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out that a zero-day exploit was used to employ a dozen pieces of malware, and the attack 
was encrypted at a level McAfee had never seen.40   
 Although espionage in the above cases did not cause communication failure in the 
governments and companies attacked, the cases illustrated three significant issues.  First, 
they showed that cyber intrusions could be sustained over time.  Second, they proved that 
even if an organization is using sound network security technology and employs a 
knowledgeable network security department, their defenses could still be subverted.  
Third, these cases show that cyber intrusions can be specifically targeted.  Moreover, and 
perhaps most importantly, many of the tools employed in cyber espionage can be 
employed to conduct cyber attacks. Once a network has been penetrated, an intruder can 
tamper with or delete data, and cause systems to fail. 
E. TARGETED ATTACKS 
 The previous section showed that cyber attackers have the ability to surgically hit 
specific targets within their attacks.  The two cases that follow show that surgical and/or 
targeted cyber attacks can be used for purposes other than espionage.  By outlining these 
cases, this section will illustrate that cyber attacks are another weapon that can be used to 
gain an advantage.   
1. Israel Attacks Syria 
 The first case is the attack of the Israeli Air Force against Syria on the night of 
September 6, 2007.  Although the attacks were not sustained over time, their surgical 
precision proved powerful and demonstrated that cyber attacks can be used effectively in 
conflict.  As a result of the attack, the Israeli Air Force was able to fly non-stealthy 
fighter aircraft 75 miles into Syria and destroy a building under construction, which was 
thought to house nuclear materials shipped from North Korea.41   
                                                 
40 Kim Zetter, “Google Hack Attack Was Ultra Sophisticated, New Details Show,” Wired, 2010, 
http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2010/01/operation-aurora/, (accessed 22 October 2010). 
41 Sarah Baxter, Michael Sheridan, and Uzi Mahnaimi, “Israelis Blew Apart Syrian Nuclear Cache,” 
The Times Online, 16 September 2007,  
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/middle_east/article2461421.ece, (accessed 5 October 2010). 
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 Syria has an extensive air defense system along its border that is designed to 
identify any aircraft that enters its air space; however, on the night of the bombings, the 
system showed Syrian operators that the air space remained clear.42 In this case, United 
States analysts claim that brute-force electronic jamming, centralized Syrian air defense 
command and control, air to ground electronic attack, and computer-to-computer links 
were used to penetrate and disarm Syrian defenses.  According to an article in Aviation 
Week, the Israeli military and government admitted they used cyber attacks as part of 
their defense capabilities.43   
Despite being hobbled by the restrictions of secrecy and diplomacy, Israeli 
military and government officials confirm that network invasion, 
information warfare and electronic attack are part of Israel’s defense 
capabilities. 
They’ve been embraced operationally by key military units, but their 
development, use and the techniques employed are still a mystery even to 
other defense and government organizations. It remains “a shadowy 
world,” says an Israeli Air Force general.  
The Syrian facility was completely destroyed, the Israeli non-stealthy aircraft 
were never detected, and via electronic means, the air warning radars and surface to air 
missiles defense systems employed by Syria failed to react to the attack.44  This marks a 
giant milestone in the evolution of cyber attacks because it is the first time a nation state 
has admitted to using cyber attacks in concert with a physical attack, by demonstrating 
actual nation state cyber capabilities. 
                                                 
42 Clarke, Richard and Robert K. Knake, Cyber War, The Next Threat to National Security and What 
To Do About it, 2010, 1–9. 
43 David A. Fulghum, Robert Wall and Amy Butler, “Israel Shows Electronic Prowess,” Aviation 
Week, 25 November 2007, 
http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story.jsp?id=news/aw112607p2.xml&headline=Israel%20Shows
%20Electronic%20Prowess&channel=defense, (accessed 10 August 2010). 
44 Richard B. Gasparre, “The Israeli ‘E-tack’ on Syria,” Air Force Technology, 10 March 2008, 
http://www.airforce-technology.com/features/feature1625/, (accessed 5 October 2010). 
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2. Stuxnet Worm 
 While this chapter was being written, the world witnessed a leap in cyber attack 
technology.  The Stuxnet worm appears to only target Siemens’ Industrial Control 
System’s (ICS) which are used, among other places, to control nuclear power plants, 
electrical grids, and other critical infrastructure.45  The worm infected over 45,000 
industrial networks around the globe; however, it appears to only be malicious against 
certain types of systems.46  Michael Assante, former chief of industrial control systems 
cyber security research at the United States Department of Energy’s Idaho National 
Laboratory was quoted saying, “This is the first direct example of weaponized software, 
highly customized and designed to find a particular target.”47  Since this case is still 
under investigation, this thesis will not go into detail, and simply point out the fact that if 
the initial findings of this worm are true, then cyber attacks against specific targets are 
gaining sophistication.  If a worm can be designed to hit only ICSs used in critical 
infrastructure, then the possibility exists that a worm can be designed to hit any specific 
target. 
 There are numerous other examples of targeted attacks, including denial of 
service attacks that have shut down particular websites and communication servers. 
These attacks often leverage “botnets” (networks of compromised computers under the 
control of the attacker through a command and control infrastructure) to amplify effects, 
but considerable damage is also possible from a single attacking machine. Such attacks 
could disrupt or disable first responder communication networks. 
 This chapter has shown the beginning of cyber attacks “in the wild,” pointing out 
that attacks have evolved and can penetrate networks that are heavily defended. We do 
not know what attacks will surface next, what individuals or even nation states have in 
                                                 
45 Paul Marks, “Why the Stuxnet Worm is Like Nothing Seen Before,” News Science, 12 October 
2010, http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn19504-why-the-stuxnet-worm-is-like-nothing-seen-
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46 Fox News, “Is a Cyber Attack Targeting Iran’s Nuclear Plant,” Fox News, 23 September 2010, 
(accessed 23 September 2010). 
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(accessed 23 September 2010). 
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their secret arsenal, or when the next evolution in cyber attacks will take place.  The last 
section of this chapter will lay out how the next evolution in cyber attacks might occur 
using a cyber attack scenario against United States critical infrastructure, in this case the 
infrastructure of a major hospital.  However, the fundamentals of the attack could be 
conducted against any critical infrastructure that is controlled digitally through 
cyberspace and any computer network attached to the Internet.   
F. FUTURE SCENARIO 
 First responders are dependent on hospitals in most disaster recovery efforts.  
They have to communicate with hospitals and other first responders before transporting 
patients.  This section will outline a possible scenario that an attacker might use to 
penetrate a major hospital in the United States.  The objective of the attacker will be to 
erode trust in the data systems and information used in the hospital to the point that the 
employees of the hospital can no longer can use it.  Once trust has been eroded, the 
hospital will fall back on manual methods of records and equipment, thus, making it 
impossible to keep pace with the operations tempo during a disaster.  It is important to 
note that the tools used in the following scenario are available today, easy to find, and 
defenses such as anti-viral software, intrusion detection systems and firewalls may not 
stop attackers from conducting similar cyber attacks.48   
 This scenario will outline five phases an attacker could employ to conduct a 
successful penetration attack on a hospital or any United States critical infrastructure that 
is attached and dependent upon the Internet.  The five phases are: footprinting, scanning, 
gaining access, maintaining access, and if possible, covering their tracks.49  Through each 
of these phases, the scenario will provide an understanding of the phases and what an 
attacker would hope to achieve in each phase of the attack.  Once an attacker has gone 
                                                 
48 NOTE: Information was presented in a presentation given by the CEO of HB Gary Inc., Gary 
Hoglund at a cyber crime conference at UC Davis on 5 August 2010.  HB Gary is a computer security 
company that works with the FBI, DHS, DoD, and civilian companies to secure their networks. 
49 Andrew Landsman, “The Five Phase Approach of Malicious Hackers,” Network Security Blog, 8 
May 2009, http://blog.emagined.com/2009/05/08/the-five-phase-approach-of-malicious-hackers/, (accessed 
8 May 2010). 
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through the five phases, they normally leave a door open in the system to allow for future 
access.  Figure 1 illustrates the five phases of a cyber attack and how the phases are an 




Figure 1.   Cyber Attack Phases 
1. Phase I  
 Footprinting of a cyber system is part of the reconnaissance portion of a cyber 
attack, and the first step an attacker takes when preparing to conduct cyber attacks on a 
system or network.  In this phase, the attacker builds a blueprint of the target and includes 
details such as the domain name, network blocks, network services and applications, 
system architecture, intrusion detection systems, specific IP addresses, access control 
mechanisms and related lists, phone numbers, contact addresses, authentication 
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mechanisms, and system enumeration.50, 51  This information can be found in many ways, 
including dumpster diving, social engineering, Google searching and Google hacking, 
and even by scanning the target’s help wanted ads, which often list what systems a 
prospective employee should have experience with.52  There are numerous software 
programs on the Internet that can be downloaded to help an attacker footprint a target.  
Just a few of the literally hundreds of  tools used to footprint are:  Whois, Nslookup, 
ARIN, Neo Trace, VisualRoute Trace, Smart Whois, eMailTrackerPro, Website Watcher, 
Google, Google Earth, Geo Spider, HTTrack Web Copier, and E-mail Spider.53  These 
footprinting tools exist on the open Internet and can be employed by anyone who wants 
to use them.  Attackers spend 90 percent of their time and energy in the footprinting 
phase of a cyber attack, and during this phase, targets usually suspect nothing is 
happening to their cyber systems.54  The footprinting phase can go on for weeks, months 
and even years if the target is worthwhile.   
 During phase I of this scenario, the attacker goes through the hospital’s job ads, 
looking for the types of software and hardware deployed at the hospital.  The attacker 
also conducts Google searches to find specific e-mail addresses of the hospital’s 
employees and what other organizations the hospitals employees are members.  A good 
example of how Google can be used to find e-mail addresses is the Google string, 
(+@XYZ.com -www.XYZ.com) where the attacker replaces the XYZ with the targets 
name.  This Google string will return a list of hospital employees’ e-mail addresses and 
                                                 
50 EC-Council, “Ethical Hacking and Countermeasures training Course,” EC-Council, 2010, Version 
6.1, Vol. 1, 220. 
51 NOTE:  Systems enumeration is a catalog or lists that groups information used by hackers.  Some 
examples of systems enumeration include list of network resources and shares, users and groups, 
applications and banners, and auditing settings.  Source: EC-Council, “Ethical Hacking and 
Countermeasures training Course,” EC-Council, 2010, Version 6.1, Vol. 2, 687. 
52 Andrew Landsman, “The Five Phase Approach of Malicious Hackers,” Network Security Blog, 8 
May 2009, http://blog.emagined.com/2009/05/08/the-five-phase-approach-of-malicious-hackers/, (accessed 
8 May 2010). 
53 EC-Council, “Ethical Hacking and Countermeasures training Course,” EC-Council, 2010, Version 
6.1, Vol. 1, 257. 
54 EC-Council, “Ethical Hacking and Countermeasures training Course,” EC-Council, 2010, Version 
6.1, Vol. 1, 220. 
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organizational website that the hospital’s employees may be associated with and access 
using their hospital e-mail addresses.  This information helps an attacker craft very 
specific phishing e-mails that can be used in Phase III, gaining access, later in the cyber 
attack.   
2. Phase II   
 The second phase in a cyber attack, scanning, is still part of the reconnaissance 
portion of a cyber attack; however, in this phase, the attacker uses more aggressive tools 
that find specific vulnerabilities in the network or systems.  Three types of scanning that 
an attacker might use include port scanning, network scanning, and vulnerability 
scanning.55  This section will explain each and provide examples of how an attacker 
would use scanning in the hospital cyber attack scenario. 
 Network scanning is used to identify active host systems on a network and map 
the network structure.  Attackers use tools such as ping sweeps to return information 
about IP addresses that correspond to live host systems on the Internet.  This allows an 
attacker to get a clear picture of what host systems are running on a targeted network.56 
 Port scanning looks for open ports on a network’s host computers, which indicate 
what services a system or network is running.  Many software programs conduct port 
scanning.  These programs target a system or network by sending a sequence of 
Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) and User Datagram Protocol (UDP) packets to 
determine if the services running on the targeted system or network are in a “listening 
state”.57  Sometimes, an attacker can gain unauthorized access to systems and networks 
through open ports if the service software is misconfigured or has vulnerabilities58   
                                                 
55 EC-Council, “Ethical Hacking and Countermeasures training Course,” EC-Council, 2010, Version 
6.1, Vol. 2, 451. 
56 EC-Council, “Ethical Hacking and Countermeasures training Course,” EC-Council, 2010, Version 
6.1, Vol. 2, 452. 
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outside the system the port is on.   
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 The third type of scanning, vulnerability scanning, is an automated method used 
to identify known vulnerabilities in a system or network.  Vulnerability scanning is 
comprised of a scanning engine and a catalog that includes a list of common files with 
known vulnerabilities and common exploits.  Just like the previous two types of 
scanning, vulnerability scanning helps an attacker gain unauthorized access to a targeted 
system or network.59   
 Scanning serves seven objectives for an attacker.  First, to detect any live systems 
running on the network.  Second, to discover which ports are open on the live systems, 
and therefore, candidates for entry.  Third, to discover the operating system being used on 
the targeted system.  Fourth, to discover the services running and specifically which ones 
are listening on the targeted system.  Fifth, to discover the IP addresses on a targeted 
system and network.  Sixth, to identify the applications and even what versions of the 
applications are running on the targeted system.  Last, to identify all vulnerabilities that 
exist on any system across the network.60  The goal of this phase is to find an opening 
and use it to exploit a given target and gain access to the system or network.   
 In the hospital scenario, the attacker uses the information found in the footprinting 
phase and applies scanning tools downloaded free from the Internet.  With these tools, the 
attacker finds several openings in the hospitals network and systems.  The attacker then 
makes a map of the hospital’s network and lists each vulnerability on each system within 
the network that will be used later to gain access to the network.  Next, the attacker 
writes, purchases, or downloads free malware and malware generators that will be used in 
phase III of the attack to gain access to the targeted system or network. 
3. Phase III   
 During phase III, the attacker employs several techniques to gain access to the 
targeted systems or network.  Using the information collected in phases I and II of the 
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attack, an attacker can conduct phishing and spear-phishing scams, SQL injections, and a 
variety of other attacks. To accomplish this, the attacker can create or acquire literally 
thousands of attack tools.  This section will discuss several methods an attacker could use 
to gain access and show how they could be employed in the hospital scenario.   
 Phishing is a mechanism that uses social engineering and subterfuge to gain 
personal information and access credentials of people on a system or network.(61)(62)  
Phishing targets a large number of people, while spear-phishing targets specific 
individuals or organizations.  Both forms typically use spoofed e-mails claiming to be 
legitimate businesses or trusted organizations in an attempt to lead their targets to 
counterfeit websites, where they are tricked into divulging personal data or access 
credentials for legitimate systems and networks.63  Phishing may also employ methods of 
subterfuge, such as planting software on a network that intercepts a user’s access 
credentials to a particular system.  Currently, most phishing scams are used to extract 
account credentials for financial services; however, these methods can be used for other 
purposes such as getting passwords to government systems.   
 Attackers can create, purchase, or download free programs that exploit 
weaknesses in systems and networks to attack their targets.  There are many malware 
generating programs on the Internet, such as Eleanor, Tornado, Napoleon, and Zeus.  
These programs allow an attacker to enter the information collected in the footprinting 
and scanning phases, and then generate thousands of attacks that can be used on the 
specific targeted system or network depending on its configuration.   
 In the hospital scenario, the attacker uses the information collected in the 
footprinting and scanning phases to launch a phishing scam against the hospital’s 
employees.  The attacker tailors the spoofed e-mails to look like they come from a 
medical employee’s life insurance company, hoping that at least one employee bites and 
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divulges account information.  The attacker also creates a spear-phishing e-mail that 
targets the hospital’s president and two top doctors.  The attacker pretends to be a trusted 
person in an organization the three belong to, hoping that if one bites, the attacker will 
gain elevated privileges within the hospital’s systems and network.  Simultaneously, the 
attacker employs the botnet building software Zeus and builds a botnet to decrease the 
chances of later being exposed by an investigation.  Further, the attacker downloads 
Tornado, a Russian malware program, loads information about the hospital’s network and 
systems into the program and generates 11,000 pieces of malware that can be used in this 
phase of the attack. 
 At this point, the attacker has footprinted and scanned the hospitals systems and 
networks, mapped and outlined vulnerabilities, and now purchased and developed the 
tools to gain access.  The next step is to use these tools to gain access to the hospital’s 
systems and network, and then sit back and wait for a month.  After a month, the attacker 
uses the gained access to deploy multiple rootkits to as many systems in the network as 
possible.  Rootkits are malware that gain administrator access to a system or network and 
use multiple techniques to avoid detection. 64, 65  Once rootkits are installed on a system, 
an attacker can use them and other malware to destroy, alter, and steal data; intercept or 
alter transmissions; and even change the behavior of a system.  Rootkits can be installed 
in the systems “operating systems kernel” and when done correctly, this code is very 
difficult and sometimes impossible to find and remove.   
4. Phase IV   
 During phase IV, the attacker employs installed rootkits and other malware to 
maintain access and begin the execution portion of the attack.  At this stage, the target 
may notice changes to data or software that indicate they are under cyber attack.  This 
section discusses how an attacker could maintain access once the target realizes they are 
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under attack, and using the hospital scenario, shows how employees could reach a state 
where they no longer trust the hospital’s systems and network.   
 The hospital computer systems administrators begin to notice strange things 
happening in their network and notify management that they may have a possible virus or 
cyber attack taking place in parts of the network.  The administrators advise management 
that they will work to remove the malware from the network.  Management agrees and 
work in the hospital continues.  The hospital’s system administrators find the malware 
that is causing the problems and remove it from the network.  They then report to 
management that the system is back to normal.  In the meantime, employees of the 
hospital are reporting that some of the data in the system does not seem to be correct and 
several errors have been found in patient records.  The hospital leadership announces that 
the network had a virus; however, the systems administration branch has found the 
infected files and removed them.  The attacker waits another month, and then uses a 
second rootkit to launch more malware, which begins to erase data, and again changes 
existing data.  Again, the systems administrators begin receiving calls that something is 
wrong with several systems across the network and they report to leadership that there 
might be another virus in the hospital’s network.  Leadership again sends them back to 
work to remove the malware from the hospital’s network; however, this time they are 
unable to find the malware and it continues to delete and change data.  The hospital 
finally decides to reload their systems and fall back on a backup they took eight days 
earlier when they believed their network was not infected.  The problem is that the 
backup tapes now incorporate the rootkits and the attacker still maintains access.   
 The attacker then uses a third rootkit to launch another phase of malware, deleting 
data, changing records, and infects equipment used for patient care.  The attack has been 
happening for over a month now, and each phase is getting worse.  The employees of the 
hospital lose trust in the digital information and equipment used to run the hospital and 
employ their emergency contingency plan.  The plan is to use paper records and manual 
equipment for patient care.  The hospital’s employees have lost confidence in their data 
systems and the attacker has achieved their objective.  At this point, the hospital might 
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call in the FBI to assist in an investigation.  They may also call in outside computer 
security companies to help find any malware that still resides on their systems and to help 
install better defenses against future attacks. 
5. Phase V  
 While the hospital scrambles to defend these attacks, wondering when the next 
phase will be employed, the attacker notices evidence of an investigation and decides to 
cover their tracks and back out of the network.  To make tracing more difficult, the 
attacker entered the hospital’s network via compromised computers belonging to a 
botnet.66  In addition, the attacker’s rootkit shuts down the logging and detection methods 
deployed on the network, making it difficult to track down the source of the attack.   
G. CONCLUSION 
 This chapter showed that cyber attackers have continually found creative ways to 
conduct cyber attacks, using cases to illustrate how cyber attacks have grown from mere 
high school pranks to deliberate attacks against civilian companies, government, and 
critical infrastructure.  With the growing threat of cyber attack and the evolving 
technology used to conduct them, it is becoming evident that corporations and 
government agencies will not always have 100 percent of their digital communications 
available.  During times of crises, organizations and states may employ cyber attacks to 
disrupt the confidentiality, availability and integrity of their adversary’s data and 
electronic communications.  This chapter demonstrated that cyber attacks can and have 
produced mass affects, and they are likely to continue.  It pointed out that the tools 
needed to disrupt the availability of electronic communications are available.  If these 
tools exist to disrupt electrical communications, then what would keep a United States 
adversary from deploying cyber attacks against United States critical infrastructure or 
even against first responders in a disaster recovery effort?  Cyber attacks could be used to 
slow a United States military response, as an extension of an adversary’s military 
                                                 
66 NOTE:  A botnet is a network of computers that have been taken over by an attacker and used to 
send out spam or launch cyber attacks. 
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response against the United States, or as an extension of an adversary’s political agenda.  
Since this threat is real, and has been displayed in several cases, DHS can no longer 
expect that they will have all communications methods available during a contingency.  It 
is time that DHS understands what a cyber attack could do to a major disaster recovery 
effort and exercise how they would operate through a cyber attack.   
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III. PREVENT, PROTECT, RESPOND, AND RECOVERY 
AGAINST CYBER ATTACKS  
There is no security on this earth; there is only opportunity. 
—Douglas MacArthur 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8 (HSPD 8) was established to 
strengthen emergency preparedness in the United States through prevention and response.  
HSPD 8 requires an all-hazards preparedness approach to improve delivery of federal 
assistance to state and local governments.67  The term “all-hazards preparedness” is a 
conceptual and management approach that uses the same set of arrangements to manage 
all types of hazards with the belief that no one knows what disaster will happen next.  
According to DHS, the term “all-hazards preparedness” refers to the nation’s 
preparedness for domestic terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies.68  
DHS has given the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) the operational 
management task of all-hazards preparedness for first responders.  In order to manage 
this task, FEMA created the National Preparedness Directorate (NPD), which provides 
all-hazards preparedness guidance for first responders at federal, state, local and tribal 
government agencies.  This guidance is built around DHS’s four mission areas of 
prevention, protection, response, and recovery against terrorist attacks, natural disasters, 
and other emergency incidents that require involvement from first responders.69  This  
 
                                                 
67 Department of Homeland Security, “Homeland Security Directive 8: National Preparedness,” 
Department of Homeland Security, 17 December 2003, 
http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/laws/gc_1215444247124.shtm, (accessed 9 November 2010). 
68 Department of Homeland Security, “Homeland Security Directive 8: National Preparedness,” 
Departement of Homeland Security, 17 December 2003, 
http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/laws/gc_1215444247124.shtm, (accessed 9 November 2010). 
69 Federal Emergency Management Agency, “National Preparedness Directorate,” Federal Emergency 
Management Agency, 11 August 2010, http://www.fema.gov/media/fact_sheets/npd.shtm, (accessed 9 
November 2010).  
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chapter defines the four areas of DHS’s all-hazards preparedness approach with respect to 
cyber attacks, and highlights why first responder communications may not be available 
during a cyber attack.   
B. PREVENT  
One way to ensure first responders communications systems will operate through 
a cyber attack is to avoid the attack completely or stop it from happening in the first 
place.  DHS’s mission area of prevention attempts to address this area and build 
mechanisms that would avoid or stop a cyber attack against critical infrastructure.  This 
section will point out the efforts currently being employed to avoid and stop a cyber 
attack, and where they fall short.  It will outline the National Security Agency’s focus on 
a layered defense-in-depth approach to the prevention of cyber attacks.  Second, it will 
look at the major mechanisms DHS is employing to create a defense-in-depth approach 
across government and critical infrastructure networks.  More specifically, this section 
will look at DHS’s Einstein Intrusion Detection System (IDS), the Trusted Internet 
Connections (TIC) initiative, and the Computer Emergency Response Teams (CERTS).  
Finally, this section will illustrate areas where these initiatives are currently failing in 
regard to preventing cyber attacks on the critical infrastructures that first responders are 
dependent upon during a major disaster. 
The National Security Agency (NSA) refers to defense-in-depth as a “best 
practice” strategy that employs intelligent people, proper use of cutting-edge 
technologies, and smart daily operations.70  The concept of defense-in-depth is widely 
accepted in the computer security industry as a means to resist and defend against cyber 
attacks; however, the industry also understands that the attackers have the upper hand.  
This section will point out that there are not enough resources or cooperation to employ 
an effective defense-in-depth strategy across all levels of governments, first responders, 
and critical infrastructure.   
                                                 
70 National Security Agency, ““Defense in Depth,”“ National Security Agency, 2000, 
http://www.nsa.gov/ia/_files/support/defenseindepth.pdf, (accessed 23 October 2010). 
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DHS’s Einstein IDS was launched to protect federal executive agency information 
technology (IT) enterprises.71 The system is currently deployed on a handful of federal 
agency’s networks including DHS, the Department of Agriculture, the State Department, 
and the Department of Interior.  All Internet traffic that flows through these agencies is 
monitored by Einstein and then analyzed by DHS’s CERT.72  What makes Einstein 
different from commercially available IDSs is that DHS has partnered with the 
Department of Defense (DoD), and is using malware signatures from specific attacks 
against the DoD and foreign allies.   
Einstein is a good start; however, it is currently failing to prevent cyber attacks in 
three ways.  First, it only detects known attacks, missing attacks that use new malware or 
that exploit zero-day (previously unknown) vulnerabilities.73  With over 54,000 pieces of 
new malware every day, this may be leaving the critical infrastructure needed by first 
responders vulnerable to a cyber attack.  Second, DHS cannot force other government 
agencies and civilian companies to use the system, and there are concerns that it infringes 
on civil liberties. DHS lacks any regulations that would give them the authority to require 
other government agencies and civilian companies to employ Einstein.  The Senate is 
being very cautious in giving DHS any real backing to enforce the use of Einstein due to 
civil liberty concerns.  The Senate is concerned that this level of intrusion detection could 
fall under the electronic surveillance laws, which would require a court order.74  If a court 
order were needed to monitor an agency’s network traffic, it would slow the process 
down significantly making it less effective in preventing cyber attacks.  Last, DHS has 
                                                 
71 Hugo Teufel, III, ““Privacy Impact Assessment for Einstein 2,”“ 19 May 2008,  
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73 Carolyn Duffy Marsan, ““Einstien 2: United States Government’s ‘Enlightening’ New 
Cybersecurity Weapon,”“ Network World, 11 February 2010, 
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been withholding data from other agencies that could have helped them address security 
breaches.75  The accusation against DHS in regards to lack of sharing information may be 
explained by the fact that only 45 of the 98 positions that perform this function have been 
filled.  In addition, the current Einstein system is said to be too slow to actually block a 
cyber attack.76   
The second mechanism DHS is deploying through their CERTs is the Trusted 
Internet Connections (TIC) initiative.  TIC is an effort to reduce the over 4,300 Internet 
connections to government systems to approximately 50.77  The idea is to restrict the 
number of connections that need to be monitored in order to better capitalize on DHS’s 
limited resources.  Again, this initiative is not being deployed to critical infrastructures 
that first responders are dependent upon.  DHS does not have regulatory teeth to actually 
force other agencies to comply. Further, reducing the number of connections to the 
Internet could create choke points for systems such as Einstein.  If Einstein is too slow to 
block a cyber attack on smaller bandwidth connections, it is hard to see how it will 
handle more concentrated TIC choke points.  Therefore, the TIC initiative could 
compound existing problems.78 
The third mechanism DHS has employed to prevent cyber attacks are the CERTs.  
DHS employs the United States CERTs to provide cyber attack support for the federal 
civil executive branches of government.  Further, these CERTs have been charged to 
share methods and information about cyber attacks to state and local governments, and 
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industry.79  Although US-CERT was originally created to respond to cyber attacks, which 
will be discussed in a later section, it is now providing preventative services to 
governments and industry by distributing information on vulnerabilities, conducting site 
visits, and suggesting ways government and industry can better secure their cyber 
assets.80  However, the preventative programs are struggling, because like the Einstein 
IDS program, they lack resources and regulatory teeth to get other government agencies 
and industry to take action on the information they provide and vulnerabilities they 
identify.  In addition, there is the question of who pays to fix the identified problems.  If a 
critical infrastructure is privately owned, should the government pay to secure it?  If 
critical infrastructure owners continually spend significant amounts of money to prevent 
cyber attacks, can they retain competitive advantage?  Last, there are no laws that 
mandate how industry should protect their property against cyber attacks.81  Even if laws 
could be used to protect privately owned property against cyber attacks, it would be 
difficult at best to pass such laws in the United States because of the concern with civil 
liberties. 
This section highlighted that although DHS is employing major initiatives to 
prevent cyber attacks, their programs are falling short.  There is a lack of resources at all 
levels of government and in industry to address the vulnerabilities and provide a defense-
in-depth strategy.  There is no central authority to direct what measures must be taken to 
prevent cyber attacks on governments and industry.  DHS is working hard to put 
measures in place to help prevent cyber attacks; however, their efforts fall short and lack 
any real teeth to ensure their measures are being followed.  Further, DHS is finding it 
difficult to fill the positions they have created to address these issues.  Until DHS is given 
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the backing by Congress and cooperation from industry, they will continue to struggle in 
their attempts to provide true prevention of cyber attacks. 
C. PROTECT 
Another way to ensure first responders can communicate through a cyber attack 
on critical infrastructure is to reduce the likelihood of a cyber attack.  In a recent cyber 
security conference held in Washington, D.C., Bruce Held, the intelligence chief for the 
Department of Energy, pointed out that you cannot stop a cyber attack; however, you 
might be able to use diplomacy to keep one from being launched: 
A static cyber defense can never win against an agile cyber offense in 
preventing a catastrophic cyber attacks.  You beat me 99 times; I will 
come after you 100 times. Beat me 999 times, I will come after you 1000 
times, and we will beat you.  If you want to protect the nation’s electricity 
grid, beefing up security for it, physical security, cyber security, etc., 
quickly becomes prohibitively expensive. You need a protection strategy, 
and that means you have to change the game. 
Essentially, it is about making an adversarial foreign power reconsider launching an 
attack. If you wish to influence my behavior, you have to impose risks and consequences 
on me.  It does not have to be perfect. You just have to impact my behavior. 
Michael Chertoff, the former Secretary of DHS, backed this idea at a conference 
in Europe, sighting President Eisenhower’s Project Solarium, which established the 
theory of deterrence.  This theory of deterrence defined the “rules of the road” and made 
it clear that if an attack on the United States or its allies took place, the US would respond 
with overwhelming force.82  Can the United States and other nations construct treaties, 
memorandums of understanding, and even international law that would have the power to 
deter cyber attacks?  This section will show that the elements needed for deterrence of 
cyber attacks do not currently exist, and therefore will not stop cyber attacks against the 
critical infrastructure that first responders need in an emergency situation. 
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It is difficult to find an authoritative statement in the United States government that 
defines deterrence with regard to defense policy.83  This thesis will use United States 
Strategic Command’s (USSTRATCOM) definition of deterrence.  USSTRATCOM is the 
combatant command that governs the sub-unified and newly organized (as of 21 May 
2010), United States Cyber Command.84, 85  USSTRATCOM’s definition of deterrence is 
as follows: 
Deterrence seeks to convince adversaries not to take actions that threaten United 
States vital interests by means of decisive influence over their decision-making.  
Decisive influence is achieved by credibly threatening to deny benefits and / or 
impose costs, while encouraging restraint by convincing the actor that restraint 
will result in an acceptable outcome.86 
 
This definition of deterrence has a classical Clausewitzian character about it; 
basically, it involves compelling your enemy to act in the way you want them to act 
without using violence.  This way of thinking about deterrence can also be found in Air 
Force Doctrine 2-12 that covers Nuclear Operations, yet has no joint doctrine 
counterpart.87  Based on these facts, it is safe to argue that this definition of deterrence is 
deeply rooted in Nuclear Operations and Air Force Doctrine.   
In order for deterrence to work, certain elements must be present.  First, all 
opponents in the game must be rational thinkers, meaning they are able to calculate the 
cost of their actions and understand that these costs outweigh the gains they will achieve 
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by taking the action.88  Second, there must be a clear threat present that is understood by 
each of the opponents.  This known threat is the rationale to build defenses and key to 
each opponent refraining from initial attack.89  Finally, opponents must have the ability to 
launch a clear counter attack after they have been attacked.90  These three elements 
needed for a successful deterrence strategy worked well for the United States during the 
Cold War.   
During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union displayed signs that 
they were rational thinkers and understood the cost of launching a nuclear missile at their 
opponents, meaning they understood what would happen in return to their respective 
nations.  Therefore, they signed Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties and developed 
multination agreements like the Limited Test Ban Treaty, which was ratified by 94 
nations.91  In addition, both the United States and the Soviet Union demonstrated, 
through test or real-world use, that they had the ability to launch a devastating nuclear 
attack on their opponents.  This element provided the threat and rationale that the costs 
could outweigh the benefits.  Finally, through intelligence gathering and open sources, 
each country understood that they could not destroy all nuclear forces of their opponent 
through an initial strike.  The advent of the nuclear submarine made it impossible for 
either country to guarantee that their opponent could not strike back. This remains a 
credible threat, even today, around the globe.92   
All three elements needed to make deterrence a successful strategy were present 
during the Cold War.  There were rational opponents, a real demonstrated threat, and the 
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ability of both opponents to launch a devastating counter attack.  Can these three 
elements be applied to cyber attacks with the strength they had during the Cold War to 
deter a nation from striking first? 
In order to explore if DoD’s nuclear deterrence strategy could be applied 
successfully to a cyber attack aimed at first responder communications and United States 
critical infrastructure, this section will apply the three elements discussed above and how 
they relate to cyber.  First, are the attackers in a future cyber attack rational?  Second, 
does anyone really understand the full threat from cyber at this time?  Finally, is it clear 
who to target in a counter attack, and if so, how effective would your counter attack be at 
costing the attacker more than what it is costing you? 
Currently, only 14 nation states possess nuclear weapons.  Of those, only the 
United States, Russia, and China have the ability to deliver them around the globe.93  In 
contrast, most nations, hacking groups and individuals, including radical terrorists, have 
the ability to launch a cyber attack.  These attacks can be delivered from anywhere at any 
time, and it is difficult at best to figure out their origin.94  This makes the argument that if 
the origins of the attack are not known, and anyone can launch an attack, then how can a 
counter attack be conducted in all cases?  Second, cyber attacks are in their infancy.  
There have been somewhat successful denial of service attacks on the countries of 
Georgia and Estonia; however, these types of attacks are basic and have not been claimed 
by a nation state.  Until a nation state or very organized group launches a full spectrum 
cyber attack and admits to the attack, it will be difficult to understand the effects of a full-
scale cyber attack.  Even if a full-scale cyber attack is carried out, the chances that an 
attacker will use the same attack next time are very low.  At this point in history, there is 
no common understanding of what cyber attacks could be in the future, and therefore, it 
will be very difficult for nations to grasp what a successful deterrence strategy needs to 
look like.  Last, since it is difficult to figure out where an attack is coming from, and no 
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nation has admitted to conducting an attack at this time, how can the United States or any 
other major nation launch a devastating counter attack?  Further, the United States, 
Russia, and China keep their cyber capabilities secret.  Without the other countries 
knowing if their opponent can conduct a devastating counter attack, the element of 
counter attack in deterrence is lost. 
If deterrence is to be successful for cyber weapons as it was for nuclear weapons, 
we must first develop the three elements around cyber attacks that have guided success 
during the Cold War.  With the vast opponents in cyber space, it is not possible at this 
time to assume that everyone is a rational thinker and understands the cost. Second, the 
threat in cyber is not understood as well as the nuclear threat was during the Cold War.  
The atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima by the United States in 1945 demonstrated the 
consequences of using nuclear weapons to the world.  The devastation it produced made 
it very clear to the world what happens when nuclear weapons are deployed.  However, 
there has not been an equivocal demonstration in cyber to date.  Without a clear 
understanding that cyber attacks can produce devastating effects, this element of 
deterrence will not be fulfilled.  Further, when the Wall Street Journal announced in April 
2009 that the United States power grid was planted with Chinese logic bombs, the United 
States did nothing.95  This action makes it difficult for our opponents to know if we really 
have ways to counter an attack when needed.  Last, without knowing quickly and clearly 
who is launching an attack on the affected computer system or network, there is no way 
to launch a successful counter attack.    
The three elements present during the Cold War that have made deterrence 
possible are not present in relation to cyber attacks.  At this time, deterrence is simply not 
a viable solution for cyber attacks.  However, the United States and other nations will 
continue to develop cyber attack capabilities and defenses in the future.  As they mature, 
we might be in a better position to develop successful cyber deterrence strategies.  Until 
then, cyber deterrence is improbable.   
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D. RESPOND   
DHS prepares for a comprehensive, swift and effective response to large-scale 
emergencies.  FEMA, under DHS, is responsible for providing the guiding principles to 
enable first responders to conduct a unified national response to disasters and 
emergencies.  These key principles are defined in the National Response Framework 
(NRF) and describe how communities, tribes, states, the federal government, and industry 
are to apply them for a coordinated, effective response.96  Specific guidelines are 
provided in the NRF’s Emergency Support Function Annexes (ESFs).  For the purpose of 
this thesis, this section will focus on the cyber incident ESF, and specifically four areas 
that present challenges for a response effort to a significant cyber attack.   
The first area that the guidelines ignore is the availability of expertise and surge 
capacity to address cyber attacks.  As stated earlier, there are not enough technical 
experts to address the wide range of ongoing cyber attacks, so what is going to happen in 
an emergency response effort when there is a sophisticated cyber attack?  DHS is finding 
it difficult to fill the cyber expert positions they have created, much less bring in extra 
help after a significant attack has occurred.   
The second area that the guidelines fail to prioritize is how multiple cyber events 
will be managed.  The cyber incident ESF focuses on what agencies and departments will 
be stood up, and how they have “established communication procedures” with the other 
agencies.  What is does not consider is how multiple attacks at once would be managed.  
Are there certain infrastructures that have a higher priority than others?  Does it matter if 
the cyber attack is causing physical damage to parts of critical infrastructure?  These 
questions need to be considered prior to a cyber attack and added to the response plan.   
The third area that the cyber incident ESF is overlooking is the fact that 
“established communication” lines between agencies could be affected by the cyber  
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attack they are responding to.  If a cyber attack disabled the infrastructure that the 
response agencies rely on to communicate, it would seriously undermine any response 
coordination.   
The last area that the cyber incident ESF does not address is how to exert any 
control over the response to a cyber attack that targets private industry.  Cyberspace and 
critical infrastructure are largely owned and operated by private industry.  This again 
highlights that the federal government and the agencies that will respond to a cyber 
incident have limited authority over the targets they are trying to protect.97   
DHS’s ESF for cyber incidents is a great start to providing a response effort in the 
event of a cyber attack.  However, until these four areas are addressed with real solutions, 
there remains a possibility that first responders will not have the communications they 
need in a disaster recovery effort. 
E. RECOVERY   
DHS recovery efforts focus on how fast operations can be returned to normal 
following a disaster.  This section will look at DHS communications systems resiliency 
efforts and compare them to programs and efforts being conducted in the European 
Union (EU).  DHS is focusing on the idea of resilience to protect physical and cyber 
infrastructure from a destructive attack, a pandemic, or a natural catastrophe, according to 
the National Security Council (NSC) Directorate for Resilience.98  In the European Union 
(EU), resiliency is focused on how to protect public electronic communications from 
cyber attack and disruptions.  Both the United States and the EU have adopted the idea 
that resilience is the best defense in the future for critical assets.  This section will show 
that the operational effectiveness of DHS’s resilience guidelines could be improved by 
developing methods more applicable at the state and local levels.  Additionally, the EU’s 
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different perspective on resilience is opening avenues and allowing their policies on 
resilience to become operational at the local and state levels.   
DHS conducted a three-phase study in order to build a definition of what 
resilience will mean to the United States in the future.  Phase one, which studied over 100 
documents and interviewed 30 plus subject-matter experts, provided the following 
working definition of critical infrastructure resilience: 
Infrastructure resilience is the ability to reduce the magnitude and /or 
duration of disruptive events.  The effectiveness of a resilient 
infrastructure or enterprise depends upon the ability to anticipate, absorb, 
adapt to, and/or rapidly recover from a potential disruptive event.99 
DHS identified three objectives within resilience: resistance, absorption, and restoration, 
and, eight principles of resilience: robustness, threat and hazard limitation, consequences 
mitigation, adaptability, risk-informed planning and readiness, risk informed investment, 
harmonization of purpose, and comprehensiveness of scope.100  These principles provide 
a comprehensive perspective at the national level; however, they fall short of addressing 
resilience at the state and local level for their first responder agencies.  DHS’s top down 
approach is overlooking areas that subject matter experts in the EU are saying is most 
important. 
Instead of a top down approach, the EU commissioned the European Network and 
Information Security Agency (ENISA) to enhance the capability of the civilian and 
government community in order to prevent, address, and respond to network and 
information security problems.101  ENISA has six areas of activity: awareness raising, 
computer emergency response teams, identity and trust, risk management, stakeholder 
relations, and resilience of local and state public networks and electronic 
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communications.  ENISA’s resilience division developed a multi-year program aimed at 
improving the resilience of public electronic communications networks, which would be 
used during disaster recovery, from both physical and cyber attacks.  They analyzed the 
27 member state regulatory policies and how they relate to providing resiliency across the 
public electronic communication systems used in disaster recovery.  ENISA found that 
the states with specific requirements to secure electronic communications, combined with 
strong public and private partnerships, have the strongest frameworks for resilience.102   
The electronic communications resiliency programs working in the EU could 
meet challenges if adopted in the United States.  They all involve high levels of 
regulation of the providers of electronic communications, audits to ensure compliance, 
and sectarian and cross-sectarian exercises to evaluate how various providers function 
during emergencies.103  Of the 27 states in the EU that belong to ENISA, the three states 
credited with the most comprehensive best practices are Sweden, Finland, and the 
Netherlands.  These three countries also rank among the top six in the world for 
perceived level of trust people have for the public sector.104  There may be a correlation 
between trust in the public sector and the best practices of detailed regulations, enforced 
audits, and government led exercises.  The same study that placed Sweden, Finland, and 
the Netherlands in the top 6 placed the United States at 19.  In the United States, strict 
regulations on private-sector electronic communications and periodic audits to enforce 
these regulations might not be as easily accepted.  However, by taking the lessons learned 
in functional area exercises and applying them to cross-functional exercises, DHS could 
vastly improve the preparation of the United States first responders, communication 
outages during disaster recovery efforts.   
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This chapter highlighted DHS’s four mission areas of prevent, protect, respond, 
and recovery with respect to communication systems.  Further, it pointed out problems in 
these areas that could jeopardize the availability of first responder communications 
during a disaster recovery effort.  At all levels of the defense-in-depth strategy being 
employed by DHS, it does not appear there is enough work force to execute the programs 
being fielded.  There is no centralized authority with regulatory backing across 
government agencies or buy-in from private industry.  Across all mission areas, there are 
plans and programs that provide guidelines; however, DHS is lacking any tools to follow 
up on any of these programs.  The full consequences and implications of cyber attacks are 
unknown at this time; therefore, the elements to create deterrence currently do not exist.  
With more transparency in the future, there would exist the opportunity for diplomatic 
measures that could reduce cyber attacks; however, it will take time and there are no 
guarantees.  DHS has made improvements in how they respond to disasters; however, 
similar to the prevention problems, DHS is facing a lack of authority and must overcome 
private-sector trust issues to become an effective response force.  DHS’s lack of authority 
over the areas they are responsible for are hindering their ability to reduce the time it 
takes to recover from a disaster.  Until DHS obtains the work force needed to operate 
their programs, the authority and cooperation of other government agencies to fully meet 
its mission requirements, first responder communication systems will likely be vulnerable 
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IV. NATIONAL EXCERCISE PROGRAM FOR FIRST 
RESPONDERS 
Amateurs practice until they get it right; professionals practice until they 
can’t get it wrong. 
—Jeffrey Ramsey, Assistant Fire Chief 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In February 2010, the first ever Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR) 
was delivered to the United States Congress, and identified safeguarding and securing 
cyberspace as one of the top five homeland security missions.105  To support this 
mission, DHS works with owners and operators of critical infrastructure and key 
resources (CIKR) in the private sector, states, and municipalities to increase their cyber 
security preparedness, risk assessment and mitigation and incident response 
capabilities.106  One of its responsibilities is to lead the National Exercise Plan (NEP).107  
NEP exercises fall into four tiers, with Tier I being directed by the White House.  Lessons 
learned from Tiers II through IV are rolled up to provide scenarios for Tier I exercises.  
The purpose of these exercises is to improve response capabilities.108   
This chapter outlines and explains the exercise tier levels in the NEP, and 
analyzes communication and procedural barriers identified in NEP exercises. The 
information in this chapter was taken from open source documents on the Internet.  For 
Official Use Only (FOUO) or classified materials were not used.  The information that 
follows is intended to help first responders operate through communications outages  
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more efficiently, obtain interoperable communications equipment for disaster recovery 
efforts, and highlight how current interoperability efforts are making them more 
vulnerable to cyber attacks. 
B. TIER IV 
The NEPs Tier IV exercises are focused on state, territorial, local, and tribal 
governments, and private sector entities.109  DHS provides local first responders guidance 
for these exercises.  Each year, one Tier IV exercise is elevated to the Tier I level.110  
However, a majority of these exercises are planned, coordinated, and executed at the 
local level, with little connection to the higher tiered exercises.  It also appears these 
lower level exercises have limited after actions reports, and most are kept in house for 
local agency use only.  While conducting research for this thesis, DHS was unable to 
provide any information concerning Tier IV exercises or any lessons learned from them.  
Although, DHS is providing guidance for the exercises, there does not appear to be an 
effort to consolidate lessons learned.  Without such consolidation, first responders are 
missing the opportunity to share observed best practices, and elevate real-world concerns 
that need to be addressed at higher-level exercises.   
The information that does exist concerning Tier IV exercises suggest there are 
problems with interagency cooperation, and as at higher levels, the communication 
equipment has interoperability problems.  Michael Fagel, a former New York City 
firefighter who spent three months working at Ground Zero after 9/11, now works for the 
Justice Department observing Tier IV exercises around the country.111  Fagel observed 
command and control being conducted in some of these exercises by parking the mobile 
communications base stations of various first responder agencies like fire, police, and 
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emergency medical services (EMS) near each other.112  This was an attempt to facilitate 
face-to face communication across agencies and highlighted the fact that cross agency 
communications systems were not interoperable.  Fagel’s observations were conducted 
over five years ago; however, there is plenty of evidence that interoperability problems 
still exist.  On October 24, 2010, in Lancaster, Pennsylvania, police officers and 
firefighters responded to a real-world gas leak at Millersville University.  The local news 
media ran an article the next day stating that first responders could not communicate 
because their equipment was non-compatible across agencies.  The article further 
explained that this problem was identified 11 years earlier and that $14 million dollars 
had been spent to fix it.113  The article pointed out that this is not unique to Millersville 
University, and in fact, occurs across the county.   
In an exercise conducted by the city of Oakland, California, first responders 
explored how they would conduct recovery efforts to a simulated 6.7 magnitude 
earthquake.114  This was the third exercise of its kind and focused primarily on the 
emergency communications that would be used in a recovery effort.  In this scenario, first 
responders had to simulate that cell and land line telephone communications were 
unavailable, and use agency radios as the primary means of communication.  The 
scenario split the city into 35 separate neighborhoods for the initial response.  Out of the 
35 neighborhoods, only 6 reported positive comments on radio communications within 
their neighborhoods, and all reported some type of radio communications problem.115  It 
is important to note that this exercise was pre-planned and all agencies understood radios 
would be the primary form of communications; nevertheless, radio communications were  
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a problem in most neighborhoods and participants had to resort to runners in order to 
communicate the locations of fires, gas leaks, and other problems needing attention.  This 
significantly slowed operations.  In an actual crisis, such problems could escalate and 
lead to unnecessary deaths.   
The interoperability problems experienced at Millersville University, in the 
exercises observed by Mr. Fagel, and in Oakland, illustrate a serious problem for first 
responder disaster recovery efforts.  They stem from a lack of centralized coordination 
and concrete direction on what technologies will work in disaster recovery efforts.  DHS 
publishes the guidance for Tier IV exercises; however, a mechanism to consolidate 
findings and make changes at higher levels that will eventually resolve some of the 
communications and other problems encountered is not being used.  It appears the people 
executing these exercises are highly motivated and making progress, but lack the 
technical expertise and resources needed to establish seamless communications during 
disaster recovery efforts.       
C. TIER III 
Tier III NEP exercises appear to be more coordinated than Tier IV, and are 
scheduled and tracked on a five year basis by DHS.  Tier III exercises are federal-level 
exercises that focus on regional plans, policies and procedures.  They do not require 
broad-level interagency involvement, and participation by national-level assets is 
determined by each first responder agency.  In the event of resource conflict with other 
exercises, Tier II exercises take precedence.116  DHS is currently tracking five Tier III  
exercises; however, only the after-actions reports for two of these exercises were 
available through open source and only from some of the participating agencies.  These 
two reports appeared professional and comprehensive from their respective agency 
perspectives.   
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The first report, titled The Spill of National Significance Exercise (SONS), was 
conducted in three phases starting June 19, 2007 and ending August 1, 2007.117  The 
United States Coast Guard, in conjunction with the United States Environmental 
Protection Agency, published an after actions report in December 2008 outlining the 
exercise and key areas that needed to be corrected.  SONS ’07 tested national-level 
contingency plans and the nation’s first responder’s readiness to respond to an oil and 
hazardous material (HAZMAT) catastrophic event.  One of the six objectives of the 
exercise was to evaluate the effectiveness of the individual agency’s notification and 
communication systems, processes and procedures.118  Seven of the 24 improvement 
areas were related to communications between agencies and equipment problems.  These 
seven areas can be consolidated into established communication processes, and 
communications equipment.119  The exercise determined that notification processes were 
not robust and that there was a lack of common procedures across agencies.  The 
command and control function of the exercise, which employed unclassified websites to 
disseminate information across dispersed agencies, suffered from lack of timeliness and 
inaccuracies.  Depending on the website, this type of communication introduces the 
vulnerability to cyber attack that could stop or corrupt the information being passed.  
When agencies experienced communications equipment problems or “comm-outs,” no 
procedures were in place to identify what alternative equipment were to be used. 
The second report was related to Golden Guardian.  Golden Guardian was a major 
portion of the NEP’s Tier III exercise Vigilant Shield.120  Golden Guardian was 
conducted in California, and tested first responder recovery efforts to a simulated 7.8  
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magnitude earthquake along 270 kilometers of the San Andreas Fault.121  Prior to this 
exercise, it was scientifically determined that an earthquake of this magnitude in southern 
California would produce the following: 
1,800 fatalities, 48,000 injuries, 1,600 fires, immediate loss of utilities and 
drinking water in the region, significant infrastructure damage to roads, 
bridges, and the interstate highways system, 350,000 household displaced, 
and 213 Billion dollars in economic loss.122 
The exercise established six objectives of which four were communications 
focused. The results of the exercise found three areas of communications needing 
improvement.123  One report about Golden Guardian pointed out in clear detail that 
communications needed more work, specifically regarding the testing and additional 
deployment of land mobile radio systems.  Exercise participants noted that cell phones in 
a catastrophic event will become useless and that interoperable radio systems are a key 
element in first responder disaster recovery efforts.124, 125 
Both of the Tier III NEP exercises discussed above had communication procedure 
and equipment problems.  They identified that in disaster recovery efforts it is crucial to 
establish what procedures and equipment will be used in advance of a disaster.  These 
cases showed that interoperable radio communications will more than likely be used by 
first responders during a disaster recovery effort.  Further, these two exercises highlighted 
that more radios are needed in some agencies and that alternative government and 
civilian radio communication systems need to be developed. 
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D. TIER II  
Tier II exercises include executive agencies and focus on strategy, policy and 
procedural issues that merit priority national and regional federal interagency 
participation.  They can utilize the National Simulation Center, if needed, and the lead 
executive agency is responsible for the coordination, planning, execution, and evaluation 
of participants.  One Tier II exercise of particular relevance to this thesis is Cyber Storm.  
To date, DHS has conducted three Cyber Storm exercises.   
In the lower two tiers, III and IV, the exercises encountered communication 
problems; however, in each case, the focus of the exercise was not to attack and take 
down communications, but simply to get them to work.  In contrast, the Tier II exercise 
Cyber Storm addresses problems that can arise from intentional cyber attacks and how 
DHS and other agencies would respond to them. 126  One of the key findings in Cyber 
Storm II was the fact that the cyber and non-cyber communities were intertwined, 
creating a need to converge and integrate response procedures tailored for physical 
disasters with those developed for cyber attacks.127  The report states that cyber attacks 
and physical attacks have interdependency in most cases.  
Physical and cyber attacks are rarely mutually exclusive.  Physical attacks 
impact cyber infrastructure and cyber disruptions can have severe physical 
consequences.  An “all hazards” approach to incident response could 
strengthen preparedness and mitigate efforts.128 
Since Cyber Storm is a simulated exercise conducted in computer labs, there are 
no physical first responders; therefore, radios are not used in this exercise.  During Cyber 
Storm, communications between agencies are kept on-line and cyber attacks and the  
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affects of those attacks are simulated.  Other Tier II NEP exercises like Positive Force 07, 
Diablo Bravo 08 and Global Lightening 09 also do not employ physical first responders 
or use radio communications.    
At Tier II, there appears to be two distinct disconnects in the NEP overall process 
and coordination.  First, at the two lower levels, problems with established procedures 
and the interoperability of radios are highlighted repeatedly in the lessons learned.  While 
Tier II exercises appear to address the procedural problems at a strategic level, they fail to 
address the radio interoperability issue highlighted at the two lower levels. There have 
been other attempts at the federal level to provide solutions and guidance for Tier III and 
IV first responder radios; however, because they were made outside the NEP, they will be 
discussed in a separate section later in this chapter.  Second, the observations from Cyber 
Storm reveals a disconnect in NEPs overall exercise coordination.  The NEP was 
developed with the idea of using lessons learned in one exercise to develop scenarios in 
other exercises that will help strengthen emergency response capabilities.  The fact that 
Cyber Storm identified the need for integrated physical and cyber attack response 
procedures highlights the need for cyber attack scenarios to be integrated into operational 
exercises at all levels.  
E. TIER I 
Tier I exercises are White House directed, focused on national strategy and 
policy-related issues, and require federal executive agency participation.  There are four 
quarterly Principle Level Exercises (PLE) and an annual National Level Exercise (NLE).  
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is the lead planning agency for 
NEP Tier I exercises, unless the Domestic Readiness Group directs otherwise.129  The 
four PLEs are focused on coordination at the Cabinet level, involving principle-level 
officials in federal agencies and forum based discussions associated with a major disaster 
                                                 
129 R. Eric. Peterson “Homeland  Emergency Preparedness and the National Exercise Program,” 10 
November 2008, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/RL34737.pdf, 13. 
53 
 
recovery effort.130  The annual NLE is designed to incorporate lessons learned at Tiers II 
and III, and is the top first responder exercise to help prepare for catastrophic crises.   
The NLE was formerly known as the Top Officials exercise series and was 
assigned the code named TOPOFF from 2000 through 2008.  In 2009, the exercise was 
re-designated as NLE.  Originally, TOPOFF was the responsibility of the Department of 
Justice.  In 2003, the Department of Justice and FEMA began to share the responsibility 
of sponsoring TOPOFF.  By 2005, DHS had been established and TOPOFF sponsorship 
switched to them and assigned to FEMA for execution.  TOPOFF, and now NLE, has 
been developed to increase the nation’s capability to prepare for, prevent, respond to, and 
recover from large-scale terrorist attacks and natural disasters.131  However, there appears 
to be problems in the corrective action process which have not been resolved.  According 
to a recent DHS Inspector General (IG) report, TOPOFF did not have a corrective actions 
process until 2007.132  Since 2007, reports from the Department’s IG and FEMA have 
both indicated that the corrective actions program is not fully implemented, recurring 
themes identified in previous exercises and real-world problems have not been resolved, 
and top officials rarely participate.  Further, these reports indicate that a cyber scenario 
has not been used in any NLE since TOPOFF II in May 2003.133, 134)  Since then, it 
appears that DHS has split all cyber scenarios off and they are only conducted during the 
Tier II Cyber Storm exercise.135   
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Until DHS finds a better method to roll-up the lessons learned at lower-level 
exercises into NLEs, and employs a comprehensive corrective actions program, progress 
to resolve first responders’ problems will remain slow.  It appears that DHS, FEMA and 
other first responders are working very hard to prepare for a disaster; however, there are 
still significant barriers hindering their progress.  After 10 years of preparedness 
exercises, the system for corrective actions has no regulatory teeth and is being ignored. 
Although Congress requires top officials to fully participate in Tier I exercises, it is rarely 
done.       
F. RADIO INTEROPERABILITY 
At the highest level of the NEP exercises, there appears to be a lack of support 
and regulatory teeth behind the annual NLE.  As a result, the same problems resurface in 
exercise and real-world events year after year.  Since the focus of this thesis is on first 
responders operating through a cyber attack, it is necessary to understand the issues 
around radio interoperability and why after being identified in 9/11, and again in 
Hurricane Katrina, the problems have not been resolved.  
When multiple agencies respond to a disaster recovery effort, interoperable 
communications systems have been and remain an issue of great concern.136  In an article 
presented in Government Security News, David Boyd, the Director of Command, Control 
and Interoperability Division in DHS, points out that budgets and planning cycles are 
pushing the different emergency responders to have different legacy communications 
systems. 137 
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David Boyd, Director of the Command, Control and Interoperability 
Division of the Science and Technology Directorate within DHS, pointed 
out that there are more than 50,000 different emergency response agencies 
in the United States and that each one has its own legacy communication 
system and its own budgeting and planning cycles.  
These communications range from databases of information that employ specialized 
software to operate, to basic radio communications first responders use to communicate 
during contingencies.  The interoperability of databases and systems used are highly 
susceptible to cyber attack, but what about radio communications?  Unfortunately, the 
solutions currently being deployed to provide radio networks interoperability lack 
specific technical specifications and increase the vulnerability of these communications 
to cyber attack.   
The interoperability problems stem from two issues.  First, the equipment first 
responders use is driven by funding and the upgrade life cycle of the equipment rather 
than a well-formulated standard and plan for deployment.  There is a federal radio 
standard in place, the Project 25 (P25); however, experts are finding that it is actually 
hindering the progress of seamless interoperability.138  Further, there are four areas where 
the new P25 standard is falling short, according to Derek Orr, program manager for 
public safety communications systems at the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST).139  First, the standard is not clear about the eight interfaces needed 
to make radios interoperable.  Second, only a portion of the P25 radios being 
manufactured are actually living up to the standard.  Third, many of the first responder 
agencies do not have the technical expertise to understand the P25 standard requirements. 
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Last, the industry lacks a formal compliance assessment program to ensure radios are 
meeting the standard.  Although these radios are proving to not be interoperable, first 
responders are mandated to spend federal funds to purchase them.   
The second concern regarding first responders’ radio interoperability issues is the 
fact that they use different frequencies.  The warning from a New York City police 
helicopter during 9/11 that the second tower was about to collapse missed many of the 
emergency responder radios because they were on different frequencies, highlighting the 
problem with first responder communications.140  Nine years after 9/11, first responders 
continue to experience the inability to talk across radio networks due to frequency 
differences.   
The solution many state, local, and even federal first responders are using to solve 
the interoperability problems is to employ gateways and connect over Internet Protocol 
(IP) networks.  In this way, first responders working the same disaster recovery effort 
with different radios can talk, assuming the gateways and patches are properly employed.  
Several companies produce and sell these gateways, allowing radios systems from 
different manufacturers running on different frequencies to talk.  Figure 2 is a diagram of 
how first responders using radios from different manufacturers with different frequencies 
might communicate during a disaster recovery effort.     
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Figure 2.   First Responder Radio Network Example 
Local and state first responders are finding that these systems are technically 
challenging to install and configure, and need to be exercised prior to a disaster recovery 
effort.  With many agencies involved in a first responder disaster recovery effort, it is 
near impossible to exercise all possible options prior to a recovery effort.  Also, if the 
links to the dispatch centers are cut during the recovery effort or repeater towers are 
destroyed, first responders lose radio communications across different systems.  Further, 
these solutions are providing an open door to cyber attacks.  To connect the separate 
systems, they must be patched together through a dispatch center.  Dispatch centers are 
connected to radio towers and other dispatch centers through the Internet, making these 





This chapter outlined how DHS uses the NEP to help meet its mission to build an 
integrated, interagency federal, state, territorial, local, and private sector capability to 
prevent terrorist attacks, and respond to and recover from terrorist attacks and major 
disasters.141  Further, this chapter explained the four-tier approach DHS uses to 
coordinate, plan, and execute exercises across first responder agencies at all levels of 
government and the private sector.  The cases discussed in this chapter identified that first 
responders at all levels are working hard to prepare for a disaster; however there are still 
many barriers to overcome and work to be done before these agencies are integrated 
seamlessly during operation-oriented exercises and real-world events.   
                                                 
141 Federal Emergency Management Agency, FEMA’s Implementation of Recommendations from Top 




Table 1 highlights the findings from the cases studied at each of the tier levels in 
the NEP.   
NEP Tier Findings Comments 
I Corrective actions program 
not implemented properly. 
DHS has no mechanism to get first 
responder agencies to correct weaknesses 
found during exercises or real-world 
events.  Problem identified in previous 
exercises are not being corrected and are 
recurring. 
 Top officials rarely 
participate. 
Congress mandates top officials 
participate in Tier I exercises; however, 
this is rare. 
II Radio interoperability 
problem not being looked at 
strategically in the NEP. 
Radio interoperability was identified in 
Tier III and IV exercises.  Tier II exercises 
could take a strategic look at this problem. 
 Physical and cyber attacks 
are usually interdependent. 
Cyber scenarios have only been included 
in operational based NLEs only once in ten 
years, in 2003. 
III More radios are needed at 
the state and local level for 
first responders. 
More radios, and the training to use them 
needs to be considered.  Interoperability is 
at Tier III as well.  
 No backup or alternative 
systems identified when 
communications equipment 
fails. 
Communication systems were expected 
to just work, and when they did not, 
agencies operated slower. 
 Unclassified websites were 
employed to communicate 
with agencies. 
This introduces the possibility of cyber 
attacks and assumes the Internet will be 
available. 
IV Lack of synchronization 
among agencies and other 
exercises. 
Lessons learned and best practices are 
not readily shared  across the United States 
60 
 
 Radio malfunctioning and 
interoperability problems.   
Agencies operate radios on different 
frequencies and with incompatible 
equipment.  Lack of technical expertise to 
program radios. 
 Money being spent to 
provide radio interoperability 
is costly. 
Agencies are throwing money at the 
problem without standards and guidance.  
Interoperability across first responders 
needs a strategic approach with concrete 
standards and methods. 
 
Table 1.   National Exercise Plan (NEP) Communication Findings 
This chapter focused on the communications equipment and procedures problems 
that arose across tiers and agencies during NEP exercises. It highlighted in DHS’s Cyber 
Storm scenarios that cyber attacks and physical attacks are rarely separate events and are 
normally interdependent.  The NEP has conducted a cyber attack scenario only once in 
10 years at an operational based NLE.  With the lingering radio interoperability problem, 
and the increase in cyber attacks on communication systems, it is highly likely that first 
responders will experience failed communications during real-world operations.  DHS’s 
lack of authority to get first responders to follow up on corrective actions is providing a 
framework that is keeping the communications scenarios in major exercises from 
progressing.  Even if first responders deploy gateways and dispatch radio networks 
together, it would be easy for an adversary to take these systems down with a cyber 
attack.  This highlights the fact that communications could drop during real-world 
disaster recovery efforts.  This problem will not be resolved in the near future, and 
practicing how operations would flow during “comm-outs” needs to become a reality.  
DHS should employ “comm-out” portions to their operational exercises to prepare first 
responders for recovery efforts.  Further, employing cyber attack or “comm-out” 
scenarios would allow first responders to build contingency plans and understand how a 
“comm-out” could affect their operation.  Current NEP exercises appear to make first 
responders look like they are practicing to get it right versus employing strategies and 





 Using a case study analysis, this thesis explored how prepared first 
responders are when communication systems are interrupted during a disaster recovery 
effort.  It showed that cyber attacks used to disrupt communications systems are difficult 
at best to defend and even the best-defended systems are vulnerable to cyber attack.  In 
addition, it highlighted that current efforts to improve first responder communication 
systems are actually making them more vulnerable to cyber attack.  Moreover, current 
first responder exercises separate out the physical and cyber portions of operations, 
making it difficult for first responders to train and understand how they would operate if 
one of their communications systems was attacked and disrupted.  By not practicing 
communication outages during operation exercises, first responders could be introducing 
confusion into a real-world disaster recovery effort.   
Adding communication outages to first responder exercises would allow DHS to 
gain insight on the effects communication outages could have on a recovery operation.  
This insight would help develop better contingency plans for first responders that will 
yield improvements in DHS’s four mission areas.  Communication outages during 
exercises would create awareness for first responders that would help them prevent 
attacks, better protect the systems they use from attack, respond quicker when a system is 
lost, and recover faster in a real-world event.  Currently, communications for first 
responder operations appear to be taken for granted, and the assumption is that there will 
be no disruptions.  DHS does conduct cyber exercises; however, only the cyber personnel 
are involved, and the exercises overlook first responders who are operating on the front 
line of a disaster.  Historical experience has shown that communications have been a 






communication outage scenarios to their exercises.  Further research is needed to look at 
the specific systems used across agencies and identify what agencies are most vulnerable 
to communication outages.  This would help DHS prioritize their resources and help the 
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